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Many studies of the determinants of investment use Tobin’s T to control for the investment
opportunities of a firm.  Tobin’s T roughly measures the average return on a firm’s capital anticipated
by the market.  More relevant for investment decisions, however, is the marginal return on capital.  In
this paper we estimate investment and R&D equations using a measure of marginal T. We use marginal
q to identify the existence of cash constraints and managerial discretion, and as a separate explanatory
variable. For a sample of 562 U.S. firms observed over the 1977-1996 period we present evidence
confirming the existence of both cash constraints in some companies and managerial discretion in
others.
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In the neoclassical theory of investment as developed by Dale Jorgenson [1963, 1967], the
amount of investment a firm undertakes is dependent on its cost of capital and current sales. This
approach can be criticized on the grounds that today’s investment is undertaken to produce WRPRUURZ¶V
output and what one really wants in the model is a measure of future sales.  Yehuda Grunfeld [1960]
was the first to suggest using the firm’s current market value as a proxy for future sales, but most of
the literature has employed Tobin’s T, the ratio of market value to current capital stock [Tobin, 1969].
Tobin’s  T theory assumes that firms are price takers operating in perfectly competitive
industries.
1  Under these assumptions differences in ratios of current market values to current capital
stocks imply differences in returns on additions to capital stocks, and should be directly related to
differences in investment.  When firms operate in imperfectly competitive markets, however, some earn
rents and these rents are capitalized in their market values.  Differences in Ts may be dominated by
differences in LQIUDPDUJLQDO returns on capital, and thus may be poor predictors of investment.  Tobin’s
T reflects theDYHUDJH return on a company’s total capital, but what is relevant for investment is the
PDUJLQDO return on capital.  What is needed to explain investment is a marginal T  One of the
contributions of this paper is to construct and employ such a variable in an investment equation.
Both the neoclassical and standard T-theories of investment assume that managers maximize
shareholder wealth, and thus investment is undertaken to the point where its return equals the firm’s
cost of capital.  In such a neoclassical world, a firm’s investment should be independent of the size of
its cash flow.  If its optimal investment is less than its cash flow, it pays dividends, if it is greater than
its cash flow, the firm raises funds in the external capital market.  A literature dating back some 40
years has found a consistent and often strong relationship between company cash flows and their
investments, however.
2  Two, quite different explanations for this relationship have been given: One
posits the existence of asymmetric information.  Some firms have attractive investment opportunities,
but the capital market is unaware of them.  If the firm is short on cash, its managers may pass up these
investment opportunities rather than issue shares to finance them, since the firm’s current share price3
is less than it would be, if the market could correctly evaluate the firm’s investments.
3  When this
occurs, the returns on the investments that the company actually makes H[FHHG its cost of capital, and
it XQGHULQYHVWV from the point of view of its shareholders.
The second explanation for a positive relationship between cash flow and investment posits the
existence of managerial discretion.  Managers obtain financial and psychological gains from managing
a large and growing firm and thus investment beyond the point that maximizes shareholder wealth. 
When this occurs, the company’s returns on investment are OHVV than its cost of capital, and it
RYHULQYHVWV from the point of view of its shareholders.
4
Given that these two hypotheses about a cash flow/investment relationship make totally
opposite predictions about company returns on investment relative to their costs of capital, a natural
way to test for the presence of their predicted behavior is to divide a sample of firms into those with
returns on investment less than their costs of capital, and those with returns greater than their costs of
capital.
5  We adopt this approach.
6  We first estimate for a sample of 562 U.S. companies the ratios of
each company’s return on investment to its cost of capital over the 1979-1996 period.  These estimates
are used to divide the sample into companies with returns on investment greater than or equal to their
costs of capital, and companies with returns less than their costs of capital.  Cash flow/investment
equations are then estimated for each subsample.  If the first subsample contains a substantial fraction
of firms with asymmetric information problems, then evidence of a positive investment/cash flow
relationship in this subsample can be interpreted as support for this hypothesis.  A positive
investment/cash flow relationship in the second subsample is consistent with the managerial discretion
hypothesis.
Although Tobin’s T is likely to be a poor proxy for the returns on a company’s investments for
the reasons given above, it can be a good indicator of the presence of asymmetric information for firms
with returns on investment greater than their costs of capital, and of the degree of managerial discretion
for firms with returns on investment less than their costs of capital.  Thus, Tobin’s T appears in our4
investment equations, but not for the reasons usually given to justify its inclusion, but rather as a further
test of the two theories that posit a positive relationship between cash flow and investment.  As we shall
see, the two theories make somewhat different predictions as to the relationship between T and
investment in a cash-flow model of investment, and thus T’s performance in an investment equation
can be a good test of the theories.
Purchases of plant and equipment are not the only investments companies make, and any theory
that can explain this form of investment should be able to explain the others.  We shall, therefore, also
estimate R&D equations for our different subsamples of firms using cash flow and T as explanatory
variables.
7
During the 1980s, the United States experienced a wave of mergers that included a significant
number of “hostile takeovers.”  Many targets of these hostile takeovers were managed by people who
had previously undertaken mergers and other investments which “destroyed shareholder value,” and
the stated purpose for the takeover was to replace these managers.  That is to say, many of the managers
of the targets of the hostile takeovers had behaved prior to the takeover as the managerial
discretion/growth maximization hypothesis predicts.  Thus, the merger wave of the 1980s quite
possibly led to a tightening of the takeover constraint on managers, and a reduction in their discretion
to invest internal cash flows for the purpose of pursuing growth.  The wave of spin-offs in the early
1990s, emphasis on “downsizing” and “returning to core competences,” and renewed interest in
“shareholder value” as evidenced by share buy backs are all consistent with the hypothesis that the
existence and/or exercise of managerial discretion declined during the 1980s and 1990s.
8  We offer
evidence in support of this hypothesis.
We proceed as follows.  Section I reviews various theoretical arguments for including Tobin’s
T and cash flow in an investment equation.  In it we also explain the methodology for calculating a
marginal T and the ratio of a firm’s return on investment(U) to its cost of capital (L), a ratio that we call
F, F = ULAswe shall see, this F is in effect an estimate of a marginal T.  In section II we briefly5
describe the data set and the procedures used to make the estimates.  The results are presented in
section III, with conclusions drawn in the final section.
,7KHRUHWLFDO,VVXHV
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where it is the firm’s discount rate at time W.  If we assume a constant discount rate L and a constant






































In a steady state of zero growth and perfect competition, J   0, r   L, and T   1.  The firm’s
only investment will be to replace depreciating capital stock.  If either J > 0 or r > L, then T > 1 and
the firm has an incentive to expand its capital stock.
This is the logic underlying the T-theory of investment.
9  It rests crucially on the assumptions
of perfect competition and that firms are price takers, which imply that marginal and average r are
equal, and  r L in equilibrium.  When firms are not price takers and markets are imperfectly6
competitive, however, marginal and average returns on capital do not coincide and equilibria may exist
in which a firm’s average return on capital differs from its marginal return.  The problem is illustrated
in Figure I.  The capital stocks for two firms are measured along the horizontal axis.  The figure has
been constructed, so that each firm has the same existing capital stock, .￿, and the same desired capital
stock, .￿, which is determined by the intersection of the marginal revenue schedules, PUL, with the
assumed identical cost of capital L.  The average return on capital for each firm is the integral of the area
under the PU line divided by its capital stock.  Although both companies have the same optimal levels
of investment, .￿ - .￿, the returns on capital for firm 2 are obviously much greater than for firm 1, and
thus so too will be 1's market value and T-ratio.  To predict the investments of these two companies
more accurately, we need to measure their PDUJLQDO returns on capital relative to their costs of capital.
 Such a measure is developed in the next subsection.
%7KHFWKHRU\RILQYHVWPHQW
Let It be a firm's investment in period W, Ct+j the cash flow this investment generates in WM, and
















We can define for any it, a permanent return, rt, on the investment It, which creates an









where ct = rt / it.  A firm which maximizes shareholder wealth undertakes all investments for which ct,
as defined by (6), is equal to or greater than one.  Estimates of ct can thus be used to predict firm
investment without confounding marginal and inframarginal returns on capital.  We now describe how
separate Fs can be obtained for each firm.
The market value of the firm at the end of period W can be defined as,7
(7) WW ￿ W W W￿ W 00 3 9 0 º+ - + -- d m
where PVt is the present value of the investment made during W, dt the depreciation rate for the firm’s
total capital, and mt  the market’s error in evaluating Mt.  If we assume that the capital market is
efficient, the error term in (7) will have the usual properties assumed in regression analysis, and (7) can
be used to estimate both d and F under the assumption that they are constant across firms or over time,
or both










Equations (7) and (8) incorporate the assumption that the market value of a firm at the end of
year W is the present discounted value of the expected profit stream from the assets in place at W. 
Changes in market value are due to changes in assets in place as a result of investment and
depreciation.  To calculate the marginal Tobin’s T, FW, one needs an estimate of the depreciation rates
of a firm’s total capital, d, where the value of this capital is measured by the market value of the firm.
The depreciation rate depends on the composition of tangible and intangible assets in total market
value, which can in theory be broken down into its separate components: (1) its stock of physical
capital (plant and equipment), (2) intangible capital due to past advertising, and (3) due to past R&D,
and (4) goodwill capital. A 10 percent depreciation rate is reasonable for the first and third stocks, is
probably too low for the second, and too high for the fourth.  As a first approximation for dt we assume
a constant d = 0.075 to calculate the FWs.
11
The FWs calculated with the use of (8) are thus essentially PDUJLQDO Tobin's Ts defined on all
investments made in W, and are more appropriate candidates as measures of company investment
opportunity than are the more familiar Tobin's Ts.
The methodology can be used to obtain aFfor a given time period. Using (7) to replace the first
right hand term in successive periods yields a multi-period version of (7),8























































Dividing (9) by  W M M



















































The hypothesis of stock market efficiency implies the  () ( WM + = m 0  for all M, and thus that the
last term on the right in (11) becomes small relative to the other two terms as Q grows large. The market
value of the firm and investment are both observable. Therefore, F can be calculated to a close
approximation using (11) for any assumed set of dt+j when Q is large.  This F, the weighted average of
the ratio of returns on investment to the cost of capital, is used to discriminate between the hypothesis
regarding investment behavior.
&7KH'HWHUPLQDQWVRI,QYHVWPHQWZLWK$V\PPHWULF,QIRUPDWLRQ
Under the neoclassical theory of investment, a firm invests to the point where its marginal
returns on investment equal its cost of capital.  A firm with marginal returns, PU, in Figure II (a) would
invest ,O.  Since this exceeds its internal cash flows, &), this firm would raise the difference between
,O and &) on the  external capital market.  A firm with marginal returns, PU￿, in Figure II (b) would
again invest ,O.  Since this falls short of its internal cash flows, &), this firm would either pay the
difference between ,O and &) out as dividends or use these  funds to purchase its own shares.  Under
the neoclassical theory a firm’s marginal returns on investment would always equal its cost of capital.
These predictions follow from the neoclassical theory of Modigliani and Miller [1958].  They
do not necessarily hold when the kind of asymmetric information posited by Myers and Majluf [1984]9
or Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] is present, even when managers seek to maximize shareholder wealth.
 When the external capital market cannot accurately evaluate the returns on a company’s capital and
investment, the firm may find it difficult to raise as much capital as it needs to finance all investment
projects promising returns greater than L, and PU > LandthusF > 1  In the extreme case, the firm is
unable to raise any capital externally, and its investment is limited to its internal cash flows.  Our first
prediction for companies for which F ³ 1 is, therefore, that their investment should be positively
associated with their cash flows.
12
The greater the difference between PU and L, the greater the incentive a firm has to raise capital
externally to finance its investments, even when its cost of external finance exceeds L.  Thus, our second
prediction for firms with F ³ 1 is that their investment should be positively associated with F.
Under the asymmetric information hypothesis companies pass up investments for which PU >
L because their common shares are currently undervalued given the firm’s returns on both capital and
investment.  Such an undervaluation seems more likely, the lower the value that the market places on
the firm’s existing units of capital.  Thus, if some firms with F ³ 1 are subject to asymmetric
information problems, we also expect a positive correlation between Tobin’s Tandinvestment.  The
reason for this expected positive association is QRW because T accurately measures investment
opportunities as assumed in the T-theory, however, in our model F plays that role.  Instead, a positive
relationship between Tandinvestment for firms with F ³ 1 is expected, because the ease with which
the firm can raise capital externally should vary directly with T.  By the same logic a firm with a high
T should be less dependent on its internal fund flows to finance its investments.  We test this
implication of the asymmetric information hypothesis by including an interaction term between T and
cash flow in the investment equation.  The predicted sign on this interaction term is negative.  The
higher T is, the weaker the predicted relationship between cash flow and investment for firms with F
³ 1.
The reader might be concerned that we have assumed capital market efficiency in estimating10
individual Fts and their weighted average, Fandyetseektotest a hypothesis that presumes asymmetric
information between managers and the capital market.  Here it should be noted that we categorize
companies as being SRWHQWLDOO\ subject to asymmetric information problems based on their weighted
average return on investment over the 18 years in our panel data.  Our procedure for calculating this
average F uses the change in the firm’s market value over the full 18 year period.  The market could
incorrectly evaluate a firm’s returns on investments in some years and our Fwouldstill be an accurate
measure of its average Ft, if the market corrected its mistake in a later period.  In using Fto classify
firms, therefore, we are implicitly assuming that any asymmetry of information about a firm’s
investment opportunities disappears by the end of our 18 year sample period.  We shall actually test
whether this prediction is supported by the data (see subsection E).
'7KH'HWHUPLQDQWVRI,QYHVWPHQWZLWK0DQDJHULDO'LVFUHWLRQ
 When F < 1 managers have overinvested from the point of view of the shareholders.  Such
overinvestment is predicted by the hypothesis that managers have discretion to pursue their own goals
and use this discretion to expand their firms. 
Managerial discretion has two sources: (1) slackness in monitoring by shareholders and the
market for corporate control, and (2) non-binding resource constraints.  In a perfectly competitive
world, managers would not be able to finance investments with PU < L for very long without risking
going out of business.  The product market would play an effective monitoring role, even if the stock
market could not.  When the discipline of the product market is weak, however, and managers have
greater cash flows than needed to finance what would be the optimal investment level from the point
of view of their shareholders, they use some of the “extra cash” they have to finance additional
investment.  This is the situation depicted in Figure II (b).  Our first prediction for firms with F < 1 is
thus that their investments are positively related to their cash flows.
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If all firms had the same cost of capital and marginal returns on investment schedule, say L and
PU2 in Figure II (b), PU would vary inversely with investment, and we would predict a QHJDWLYH11
relationship between F and investment for the subsample of companies with F < 1.  But the assumption
that all firms face the same PU schedule and have the same L is untenable.  With different PU schedules
and Ls, there is no reason to expect any relationship between F and investment.  For example, if firms
1 and 2 in Figure II (b) had the same Land invested amounts ,1 and ,2, respectively, their Fs would be
identical (F = ML, although their investments would differ.  We predict, therefore, that F and , are
unrelated in the subsample of firms for which F < 1.
Both the threat of a hostile takeover and the resource constraints on managers should be lower
for firms with relatively high share prices.  We thus predict that managerial discretion increases with
Tobin’s T, and expect a positive relationship between investment and T for companies with F < 1. 
Since managerial discretion manifests itself as overinvestment out of cash flows, the relationship
between cash flow and investment should grow VWURQJHU as managerial discretion increases.  We thus
again include an interaction term between T and cash flow in the investment equations, as we did for
firms with F ³ 1.  For firms with F < 1, however, the predicted coefficient on this interaction term is
positive, the opposite sign from that predicted under the asymmetric information hypothesis.
(&KDQJHVRYHU7LPH
We use equation (11) to calculate a separate F for each of the 562 companies in our sample for
the period 1977  to 1996.  Each company’s F can be regarded as a ZHLJKWHG DYHUDJH of its individual
yearFs over the 18 year period with the annual investments as weights.  We categorize companies as
being likely to asymmetric information problems or managerial discretion on the basis of these Fs.
Thus, we test for the asymmetric information hypothesis in the subsample of firms for which we
compute a F ³ 1 over the 18 year period.
If a firm’s investments continually have returns greater than its cost of capital, however, the
capital market should adjust its evaluation of the firm’s investment opportunities upward, and the
firm’s difficulties in raising capital externally should decline.  We thus predict a decline over the course12
of our sample period in the importance of both cash flow and Tobin’s T as explanatory variables in the
investment equation for firms with F ³ 1. 
As noted above, the increased number of hostile takeovers over the course of the 1980s, the
subsequent spin-offs, downsizing, de-diversification and stock buy backs all are consistent with the
hypothesis that managerial discretion and empire-building declined over our sample period.
14  We thus
also predict a decline in the size and significance of both cash flow and Tobin’s T in the investment
equation for firms with F < 1.
)6XPPDU\RI+\SRWKHVHV























































These resemble cash-flow/investment equations from other studies except for the inclusion of
our measure of marginal T, FW, and the interaction term between T and cash flow.  All of the independent
variables are lagged one period to avoid their being partly endogenous.
We have classified firms for the purpose of testing the different hypotheses using Fs calculated
over 18 years.  A company’s investment opportunities can be expected to vary from year to year,
however, and thus to predict a firm’s investment in a given year, we need a short run estimate of
returns.  We thus use a one period F, namely the change in a company’s market value in the previous
year divided by its total investment in that year (see eq. (8)).  Since both share prices -- and thus market
values-- and investment are highly volatile, these one period FW s vary considerably over the sample
period.  For example, the variance in FW is 15.6 times the variance in T (see Table II).  Choosing a13
variable with such a large variance to explain investment puts the theory to a severe test.
While we predict that this measure of the short run attractiveness of investment will be
significantly related to investments in plant and equipment for the subsample of companies for which
the asymmetric information hypothesis applies, we do not make this prediction for the R&D equation.
 There are significant transaction costs in expanding and contracting R&D activities, and we do not
expect R&D outlays to be responsive to short run changes in returns on investment.  We thus exclude
Ft-1 in the R&D equation. Table I summarizes the predictions derived from the different theories.  For
completeness, we include the predictions from the neoclassical/T-theory, however, we exclude our
predictions over time.  We have placed a zero in the table wherever the theory makes a clear prediction
of no relationship, as for example for cash flow under the neoclassical theory, and a question mark
where there is no obvious relationship from the underlying hypothesis.
,,0HWKRGRORJ\DQG'DWD
To use (8) and (11) we need data on the market value of each firm and its investments.  The
market value of a firm at the end of year W Mt, is defined as the market value of its outstanding shares
at the end of year W plus the value of its outstanding debt.  Since this number reflects the market’s
evaluation of the firm’s total assets, we wish to use an equally comprehensive measure of investment.
 Accordingly we define investment as
(14) , $IWHUWD[SURILWV'HSUHFLDWLRQ'LYLGHQGVD'HEWD(TXLW\5	'$'9
where  D'HEW and D(TXLW\ are funds raised using new debt and equity issues.  Since R&D
(COMPUSTAT item 46) and advertising (ADV, item 45) are also forms of investment that can produce
“intangible capital” which contributes to a company’s market value, we add them to investment to
obtain a measure of the firm's additions to its total capital.
Tobin’s T is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to its total assets (item 6) where
the market value of the firm equals the market value of common equity (items 199 (share price at the14
end of the fiscal year) times 25 (common shares outstanding)) plus the book value of preferred stock
(in order and as available items 56, 10, 130) plus the book value of total debt (which is the sum of total
short term debt (item 9) and total long term debt (item 34)).
15  Cash flow is the sum of after tax profits
(item 18) and depreciation (item 14) minus total dividends (item 21 plus item 19 if available).  We
adjust the cash flow measure by adding the portion of R&D that is expensed for tax purposes.
16 Our
measure for the capital stock is net fixed assets (item 8, the cost net of accumulated depreciation of
property, plant and equipment).  All variables are deflated by the Consumer Price Index and are
expressed in real 1987 U.S. dollars. 
Using equation (11) to calculate the full period F
17 requires the availability of market value and
investment figures for the 1977 to 1996 period which reduces the number of firms to 562 from a
potential of 5140 firms.
The data are taken from the 1996 version of the Compustat data set.  This data set contains
accounting and financial data on 9,862 active companies with listed stocks in North America starting
in 1977.  We exclude 4,722 companies in financial and service industries, because the nature of capital
and investment in these industries is so different from that in other industries.  After the construction
of our basic variables and after the elimination of some obvious outliers
18 in the data, the number of
companies reduces to 562.  The data series used in this study ends in 1996. Table II reports summary
statistics and correlations of the variables that we use throughout the paper.
Before turning to our main findings, a comment on the numbers in Table II is warranted.  The
simple correlation between the ratio of cash flow to capital stock and Tobin’s T is fairly high – 0.183.
 This is not surprising, since both are measures of DYHUDJH returns on capital.  The correlations between
the cash flow variable and our two measures of marginal T, on the other hand, are quite low – 0.019
and 0.06.  These low correlations suggest that any relationship that we find between cash flowand
investment in our sample is unlikely to come about, because cash flow is proxying for a firm’s




Table III presents the results for investment in plant and equipment with observations pooled
over the 18 year time period.  For the grand sample, all four coefficients on the explanatory  variables
are highly significant.  The positive and significant coefficient on cash flow is, of course, inconsistent
with the neoclassical/T-theory hypothesis. Our measure of marginal TFt-1, takes on a positive sign as
predicted, with a W-value over five.
Equation (2) presents the results for the subsample of companies with F ³ 1.  The coefficients
on both Ft-1 and Tt-1are positive and significant. Given that Ft-1 is included to capture the attractiveness
of a company’s investment opportunities, we interpret the positive coefficient on TW￿￿ as an inverse
measure of the importance of asymmetric information for a company.  Holding cash flow constant,
companies with high Ts invest more, because they have less difficulty raising cash externally.  This
interpretation of  the role played by T in the investment equation is reinforced by the performance of
the T/cash-flow interaction term.  Its negative and significant coefficient implies that the sensitivity of
a company’s investment to the level of its cash flow declines as the value that the market places on its
existing capital rises, and thus as its access to external capital improves.  Similarly, the link between
T and investment grows weaker, the greater the firm’s cash flows, and thus the less important access
to the external capital market becomes.
Cash flow also has a positive coefficient in the equation for firms with F < 1.  In contrast with
the subsample where F ³ 1, the interaction term between T and cash flow is SRVLWLYH and significant for
firms with F < 1.   We hypothesized that Tobin’s T would proxy for managerial discretion in this
subsample. Equation 3 is consistent with this hypothesis.  For firms with F < 1, the marginal impact
of cash flow on investment increases as T increases.  Tobin’s T also has an independent positive and
significant impact on investment.  Taken together these results offer considerable support for the
managerial discretion hypothesis.  Many managers of firms with relatively high share prices and cash16
flows appear to take advantage of the discretion they have over the allocation of these funds to expand
their companies beyond the point that is optimal from the point of view of their shareholders.
The estimates for equations 2 and 3 imply almost identical marginal impacts of cash flow on
investment for the two subsamples (¶,t / ¶(&)t-1/.t-1) = .134 for the F ³ 1 subsample, and ¶,t / ¶(&)t-
1/.t-1)= .129 for F < 1 firms, when T is evaluated at the respective sample means, see Table IV). Firms
that seem to fit the cash-constraints hypothesis or that appear to have overinvested over the 1979-1996
period spend on average 13 percent of any additional cash flow on capital investment.
In contrast, the marginal impacts of Tt-1 on investment are quite different between the two
subsamples (¶,t / ¶Tt-1  = .025 for F ³ 1 companies, and .082 for F < 1 firms, with &)t-1/.t-1 evaluated
at its subsample means. The difference is significant at the one percent level.
20).  Increases in T appear
to have a greater impact on managerial discretion and managers’ use of their discretion than on easing
external capital market constraints for firms that may be cash constrained.
We have stressed the logical superiority of a measure of PDUJLQDO T over average T as an index
of the firm’s investment opportunities.  Our measure of marginal T, Ft-1, has a positive and significant
coefficient in both the capital investment equation estimated over the full sample of companies, and
in the subsample with F ³ 1, where investment behavior may be influenced by cash constraints.  We
did not predict a relationship between marginal T and investment, however, for those companies that
appear to be overinvesting, nor do we find one. The coefficient on Ft-1 is insignificant for F < 1
companies, despite this subsample having 4534 observations, 50 percent more than the F ³ 1
subsample. Moreover, a t-test reveals that marginal q has a significantly (five percent level) greater
impact on investment for F ³ 1 firms as compared to F < 1 firms. What drives the investments of
companies in our second subsample is not the height of their investment opportunities on the margin,
but their resources and discretion to pursue additional investment.
21
We gave reasons above for possibly expecting a weakening of the asymmetric information17
problem and/or the extent of managerial discretion over time.  Such a development should manifest
itself as a decline in the coefficients on either cash flow or T over time.  There is no reason to expect,
however, that these coefficients will eventually turn negative.  To avoid this possible implication,
therefore, we did not interact each term with W as is the common practice, but rather with its reciprocal.
This method of allowing for time-related changes in coefficients imposes the reasonable restriction that
the magnitude of the changes itself declines over time, and the coefficients on each variable
asymptotically approach given values.
Equations 4-6 in Table III report the results, omitting those interaction terms with W that are
statistically insignificant. The easiest way to understand the results is again to compute the implied
partial derivatives for lagged cash flow and T at both the start of our sample period, 1979 (W = 1), and
in the long run (W ® ¥).  These are given in Table IV.  For firms with F ³ 1, there was not a significant
change in the coefficients on Ft-1,  Tt-1, or on the Tt-1-cash flow interaction term.  Marginal T has the
same positive and significant impact on investment throughout the period.  The marginal impact of a
change in lagged T is also the same throughout the period.  It is positive for firms with F ³ 1, but
declines as cash flow increases as implied by the asymmetric information hypothesis.
22
Evidence of a weakening of the asymmetric information problem is found in the changes of the
marginal impact of cash flow on investment over time.  Evaluated at the subsample mean of Tt-1, the
partial derivative of investment with respect to cash flow declines from .402 at the beginning of the
sample period to a long run projected value of only .053.
There is also some evidence of an attenuation of managerial discretion during the sample
period.  Our estimate of the coefficient on the T-cash flow interaction term are positive and quite large
for the beginning of the sample period as we predicted under the managerial discretion hypothesis.  It
declines with time and actually approaches a negative value, although small in absolute value, in the
long run. The estimated marginal impacts of cash flow and T on investment for F < 1 companies both
decline, when evaluated at the subsample means for the appropriate interaction variable (see Table IV).18
 The decline in the marginal impact of lagged cash flows is rather modest, however, and its estimated
marginal impact as well as that of lagged T remains positive and significant even in the very long run.
 The impact of managerial discretion on corporate investment may have weakened over the course of
the 1980s, but it did not totally disappear.
We predicted that the investments of firms characterized by managerial discretion motives
would be unrelated to the marginal returns on these investments.  This was true at both the beginning
and the end of the period.
Part B of Table III presents the results when R&D is the dependent variable.  The equations are
identical to those for which investment is the dependent variable except that Ft-1 has been omitted, as
R&D is not expected to respond to short-run estimates of returns on investment.  The results are quite
similar to those reported for capital investment.  Looking first at the three equations where no time
trends are included, we see that for F ³ 1 firms, the coefficients on both cash flow and T are positive
and significant.  Unlike for the capital investment equation, however, the sign on the interaction term
is also positive, although insignificant and significantly smaller than for F ³ 1 firms.  Support for the
asymmetric information hypothesis over the predictions of neoclassical theory can still be claimed on
the basis of the very large and highly significant coefficient on cash flow in the R&D equation for F
³ 1 firms.
In the F < 1 subsample, the coefficients on all three variables are positive and significant as
predicted under the managerial discretion hypothesis, although the coefficient on Tt-1  is only significant
at the 10 percent level (one-tailed test).  In addition to being of the correct sign and significant, the
coefficients on cash flow and on the T-cash flow interaction term are quite large, and imply a marginal
impact of cash flow on R&D spending for F < 1 firms of .266, an estimate of cash flow’s impact that
is double that for the F ³ 1 firms. Thus, the pattern of results for R&D in equations 2 and 3 of Table
III also offers considerable support for both the asymmetric information and managerial discretion
hypotheses.19
Equations 4-6 in Part B include the significant interaction terms with W.  For the subsample
with F ³ 1 again only the interaction term with lagged cash flow is statistically significant.  Its inclusion
causes the interaction term between lagged T and cash flow to become significant, while remaining
positive.  This result contradicts our prediction for the asymmetric information hypothesis.  The
dramatic decline in the marginal impact of cash flow on R&D from .4 at the beginning of the sample
period to a project .053 in the long run is, on the other hand, quite supportive of the prediction that
asymmetric information should disappear with time.  No significant time trends were observed in Ts
impact on R&D for the F ³ 1 subsample. Thus, the coefficients in Table III for the F ³ 1 firms imply
that they begin the sample period looking like firms subject to asymmetric information problems, but
are projected as time elapses to behave more and more like companies that fit neoclassical/T-theory,
with T strongly related to R&D spending, and cash flow rather weakly related.
The estimates for Eq. (6) in Part B of Table III imply positive coefficients on the cash flow/T
interaction term at both the beginning of the sample period and in the very long run, and thus are
consistent with our prediction.  The estimates also imply a substantial decline in the interaction term’s
coefficient from .20 at the beginning of the sample period to .014 in the long run.  This change implies
a decline in managerial discretion over time.  A weakening of managerial discretion is also implied by
the estimated decline in the cash flow’s marginal impact on R&D from .337 in 1979 to .243 in the long
run (Table IV). 
No decline over time in lagged T’s effect on R&D is apparent in Table III, however -- quite the
contrary.  The marginal impact of T rises from near zero in 1979 to .067 in the long run.  Thus, although
the results in Table III suggest some attenuation of managerial discretion’s impact on R&D spending
after 1979, as was true for capital investment, all long-run projected coefficients for the F < 1 firms are
still consistent with our predictions for this hypothesis -- a positive and large marginal impact of cash
flow, a positive and large impact of lagged T, and a positive, albeit modest, interaction effect.
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Tables V and VI present various robustness checks. Columns 2 to 4 in Table V present
investment equations including an accelerator term. This term is highly significant, nevertheless, the
basic results concerning our hypotheses are not altered.
In Tables III and IV separate coefficients on the deflated intercept term (.t-1) were estimated
for each two-digit SIC industry. In the investment equation this amounts to assuming different
depreciation rates for each industry, while in the R&D equation the procedure amounts to controlling
for differences in R&D intensity across industries.  We also estimated the basic equations with fixed
effects terms, thus allowing for firm-specific rates of depreciation in the investment equation and fixed
differences in R&D intensity across firms. The results were qualitatively similar to those reported, and
are presented in columns 5 to 10 in Table V for the basic model. Once we control for unobserved
heterogeneity in investment spending across firms, the coefficient for our marginal q variable in the F
< 1 subsample also becomes significant (t = 2.30). However, the coefficient is again much smaller than
for the F ³ 1 subsample and the difference is again significant at least at the five percent level. These
results suggest that unobserved firm characteristics capture differences in managerial discretion across
firms, and once these differences in managerial discretion are controlled for, the investment of these
firms also varies with marginal q, albeit to a lesser extent than for F ³ 1 firms.
23
Many studies
24 have hypothesized that firm size is an important determinant of either
asymmetric information or managerial discretion, or both. Smaller firms may face higher asymmetry
of information and transaction costs implying a greater reliance on internal funds. Larger firms may
have lower threats of takeover and thus be more susceptible to discretionary managerial spending.
Table VI, Panel A splits the sample into small and large firms based on their median sales. In columns
4 and 5, the sample is further divided into small firms with F ³ 1 and large firms with F < 1 firms.
25
These two subsamples might be expected to exhibit the greatest degrees of asymmetric information and
managerial discretion. The results reinforce the earlier findings. Marginal q’s impact on investment is
much larger and significantly different for small firms than for large firms, the cash flow/q interaction21
term is negative and significant for small firms and positive (although insignificant) for large firms, and
cash flow has a larger (and significantly different) impact on investment for large firms than for small
firms. Columns 4 and 5 show that these differences are most pronounced, when we additionally split
by mean marginal q: For small/high F firms, marginal q is a positive and significant determinant of
investment, whereas for large/low F firms this is not the case. The cash flow/q interaction term is
negative and significant for small and high F firms, but positive and significant for large and low F
firms. These differences are all significant at the one percent level in accordance with our earlier
predictions and results. Cash flow and Tobin’s q have larger (and significantly different) impacts on
investment for large/ low F firms than for small/ high F firms.
In Panel B of Table VI dividend payouts are used as a discriminatory device. Firms that pay
little or no dividends are the most likely to be cash-constrained [Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988].
On the other hand, high dividend payout firms are less likely to suffer from managerial discretion, since
dividend payouts reduce discretionary spending opportunities [Jensen, 1986]. We define "low dividend"
firms as having an average dividend payout ratio over the sample period of less than 10 percent of cash
flow, and "high dividend" firms as those with an average dividend payout ratio above 10 percent.
26 The
sample is again first split only by the dividend criterion (columns 2 and 3 in Panel B of Table VI), and
then according to F. The results again support our prior claims. Low dividend/high F firms match the
predictions of the asymmetric information hypothesis, low dividend/low F firms match the managerial
discretion hypothesis.
An additional obvious criterion for splitting the sample, given the logic of our tests of the two
hypotheses, is by Tobin’s q. The investment of firms with F ³ 1 and q < 1 should be most susceptible
to cash constraints problems, managers of companies with F < 1 and q > 1 are most likely to have the
discretion to overinvest and to be using it. Such splits greatly reduce the numbers of observations in
each subsample, however. Nevertheless, the predictions of the two hypotheses are again confirmed for
the two subsamples.
2722
We have stressed the importance for investment models of the distinction between marginal and
average (Tobin’s) q. We have employed our own measure of marginal q, but for Tobin’s q we have
chosen one of the many measures others have used, namely firm market value divided by total assets.
Although more complicated measures of q may have conceptual advantages for other purposes, we
think that this simple measure is well-suited for the role q plays in our model - particularly with respect
to the asymmetric information hypothesis. The capital market can readily ascertain the book value of
a company’s total assets from its balance sheet. If the market value of the firm is much above this
balance sheet figure, it is reasonable to assume that the company will not have difficulty in raising
capital externally. Nevertheless, we have checked the robustness of our results with respect to other
definitions of Tobin’s q. Our conclusions do not change if we define q as in Lindenberg and Ross
[1981], or in Kaplan and Zingales [1997],
28 or when we adjust the denominator of Tobin’s q for the
intangible capital stock due to R&D.
29
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Both the asymmetric information and managerial discretion hypotheses predict a positive
relationship between companies’ cash flows and  their investments.  The logic underlying these
predictions is quite different, however, and this logic leads to the complementary predictions that the
returns on investment for firms that fit the asymmetric information hypothesis are JUHDWHU than their
costs of capital, while the returns on investment for firms that fit the managerial discretion hypothesis
are OHVVthan their costs of capital.  We have used these predictions of the two theories to subdivide our
562 companies into two samples, and tested each hypothesis for the sample for which it was best suited.
Many studies have used Tobin’s T to control for differences in investment opportunities across
companies. We have argued, however, that because T reflects differences in DYHUDJH returns on capital
across firms, it is inferior to a measure of PDUJLQDO returns on capital, i.e. returns on investment, to
control for investment opportunities.  We have calculated such a measure, our Ft which represents the
ratio of the returns on a firm’s investment to its cost of capital, and used it to capture differences in23
investment opportunities across companies.
Although we do not interpret Tobin’s T as a measure of investment opportunities, we do include
it to test both hypotheses.  We predict that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow declines under the
asymmetric information hypothesis as T rises, because firms with high Ts should have less difficulty
raising external capital.  In contrast we predict an increase in the coefficient on cash-flows as T rises
under the managerial discretion hypothesis.  Both predictions are supported  for the capital investment
equation in the appropriate samples of companies, and the prediction is supported for the managerial
discretion hypothesis subsample, when R&D is the dependent variable. 
We did not observe a negative coefficient for the T-cash flow interaction when R&D is the
dependent variable, and the asymmetric information hypothesis subsample is used.  This result is less
damaging to the asymmetric information hypothesis than it may seem.  The negative sign on the T-cash
flow interaction variable is predicted, because cash flow should be less essential for financing attractive
investment projects for companies with high Tobin’sTs.  These firms can readily raise the required
funds in the equity or bond markets.  R&D is a much longer run type of investment than purchases of
plant and equipment, however, and adjustments in levels of R&D spending are likely to be slow.  Thus,
companies are less likely to issue equity and debt to finance R&D, and the importance of cash flow to
finance R&D is unaffected by the level of T
We do not predict nor find a relationship between ct-1 and investment for firms that fit the
managerial discretion hypothesis, since these firms have on average invested in projects with returns
below their shareholders’ opportunity costs.  Only the measures of managerial discretion - cash flow
and T - explain the investments of these companies. 
In contrast, companies which on average have returns on investment greater than their costs of
capital are behaving in a way which is consistent with their maximizing shareholder wealth, albeit
perhaps under the handicap of asymmetric information.  We expect and find that the investments of24
these companies respond to changes in our measure of returns on investment.
Market ignorance of the returns on a company’s capital and investments cannot last forever.
 Time reveals these returns and asymmetry of information disappears.  We thus predict a weakening
of support for the asymmetric information hypotheses in our balanced panel of firms as time elapses.
 This prediction is also confirmed by the data.
There is no analogous logical argument to lead us to predict a decline in managerial discretion
over time.  Because a wave of hostile takeovers took place in the midst of our sample period, and
because many of these appeared to be intended to curb exactly the kinds of abuses of managerial
discretion that fit our hypothesis, we tested to see whether there was evidence of a decline in
managerial discretion over time.  This prediction was also confirmed.
Thus, the results of this article support both of the two main hypotheses tested.  For companies
that had, on average, marginal returns on investment equal to or greater than their costs of capital, the
estimates for both the investment and the R&D equations offered more support for the asymmetric
information hypothesis at the beginning of our sample period than at the end.  This too can be
interpreted as support for the asymmetric information hypothesis, since it is reasonable to assume that
the capital market’s ignorance of the returns on investment of companies disappears over time.  Those
companies whose returns on investment over the 1979-96 period were at least equal to their costs of
capital were projected by the end of the period to behave fairly closely to the predictions of the
neoclassical T-theory with respect to both their R&D and investment -- a strong relationship between
T and each type of investment outlay, almost no relationship between cash flow and the two types of
investment.
Although our estimates also imply a reduction of managerial discretion over the sample period,
they do not imply its total disappearance.  Cash flow and T both are projected to have strong
independent and a (weak) joint impact on both capital investment and R&D spending.  Our estimate
of the marginal effect of cash flow on investment for the managerial discretion subsample is more than25
double that for the asymmetric information subsample;  cash flow’s marginal effect on R&D is almost
five times greater for the managerial-discretion subsample. Tobin’s T also has much larger marginal
impacts on the two investment outlays for the managerial discretion subsample.  Although the hostile
takeovers of the 1980s may have induced a decline in managers’ willingness to exercise the discretion
at their disposal, evidence of managerial discretion in the investment behavior of companies has by no
means disappeared.
These conclusions are reinforced by several robustness checks using additional splits of the
sample such as size and dividend payouts.
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1. For a full exposition of the assumptions underlying the T-theory, see Hayashi [1982].
2. See, Meyer and Kuh [1957].
3. Myers and Majluf [1984], Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988]. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein [1991].
4. Marris [1964, 1998] first motivated and developed the growth maximization hypothesis.  Grabowski and
Mueller [1972] were the first to test its implications using a cash flow/investment model.  For more recent tests
see, Vogt [1994], Carpenter [1995] and Kathuria and Mueller [1995].
5. A third explanation for a positive relationship between investment and cash flow would be that a firm
encounters rising transaction costs as it enters the external capital market [Duesenberry, 1958].  This explanation
makes similar predictions to the asymmetric information hypothesis, and thus we do not try to test for it
separately.
6. Testing for the presence of asymmetric information by forming one subsample of companies that are likely to
be cash constrained, and a second with companies that are unlikely to be constrained has become standard
practice in the literature.  See, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988].  We modify this procedure by choosing a
different criterion for making the split.
7. Mergers would be an obvious third form of investment to try and explain with the two theories.  The extreme
“lumpiness” of this investment creates severe estimation problems, however, and thus we do not include it as one
of our investment decisions in this paper.
8. See, (FRQRPLVW [1994] and Mikkelson and Partch [1997], who report a more active market for corporate control
in the period 1984 to 1988 than the 1989-1993 period.28
9. See again, Hayashi [1982] for a formal development of the theory.
10. We use this approach to calculate a separate c for each firm for the period 1977-1996 in section E.
11. Mueller and Readon [1993] have estimated d to be between six and eight percent.  Mueller and Yurtoglu
[1998] estimate d to be around five percent for a larger sample of companies from around the world.  As a
robustness check on this estimate, we repeat all our calculations with ds of five and 10 percent.  The qualitative
nature of our results is not affected by the choice of d.
12. Indeed, if all companies with F  ³ 1 had investment opportunities as depicted in Figure 2a, and none could
raise any external capital, their investments should exactly equal their cash flows, and the coefficient on cash flow
in an investment equation for this subsample would equal 1.0.
13. See Jensen [1986] and references in footnote 4. Kathuria and Mueller [1995] assume that managerial utilities
are a function of the growth of the firm and security from takeover, and derive the prediction that ERWK investment
and dividends increase with increases in cash flows, and thus that the coefficient on cash flow in an investment
equation is positive and less than one.
14. The merger wave that has accompanied the booming stockmarket of the late-1990s suggests that the decline
in managerial empire-building may have been short lived.
15. We tried a number of other definitions of Tobin’s q, see the discussion in section III.
16. We add (WD[UDWH) times the R&D expenditures to cash flow.  The tax rate that is used is 50 percent for the
1979-1987 period and 34 percent for the 1988-1996 period.
17. We have also estimated a separate F for each company using a version of equation (7).  This procedure allows
for the simultaneous estimation of the depreciation rate, d, and F.  The correlation coefficient of estimated and
calculated cs was about 0.6 and none of our results changed qualitatively.  These results are available from the
authors upon request.
18. For all variables that enter our equations, the extreme values defined as the top and bottom one percent of
the sample observations are deleted.  This allows for a uniform definition of outliers and leads to more robust
results.
19. Kaplan and Zingales [1997] conclude from 10-K reports and balance sheet data for Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen’s [1988] sample that fewer than a sixth of the companies were cash constrained.  Kaplan and Zingales
speculate that cash flow may be proxying for investment opportunities for the unconstrained companies.  Since
this does not appear to be a likely explanation for a positive relationship between cash flow and investment in
our sample, we are left with the managerial discretion and asymmetric information hypotheses to explain such
a relationship.
20. Throughout the paper all partial derivatives with respect to either CFt-1 or qt-1 are evaluated at the mean of the
other variable in the interaction term. To perform simple t-tests on the difference between coefficients from
different samples we have to assume that the regression error terms are independent across sub-samples.29
Statistical significance between regression coefficients is indicated by an equality sign between columns 2 and
3.
21. Since the full sample has been partitioned by the values of mean c over the full sample period, the variances
of ct-1 are reduced in both subsamples. This reduction in variation could bias the coefficients on ct-1 towards zero,
and may help to explain the insignificance of ct-1 in the F < 1 subsample. The same bias exists in the F ³ 1
subsample, however, where the coefficient on ct-1 was positive and significant as predicted. This result plus the
statistical significance of the difference between the coefficients on ct-1 for the two subsamples leads us to believe
that our partitioning by F does not cause serious bias.
22. The sign of the partial derivative of investment with respect to Tt-1 remains positive for almost all firms
according to the distribution of Tobin’s q’s.
23. At first sight, one may wonder about the negative coefficients for cash flow and Tobin’s q in the R&D
equation for the F < 1 firms. However, the cash flow/q interaction term more than outweighs these negative direct
effects of cash flow and q so that the predicted marginal effects of both cash flow and q (evaluated at the
respective sample means) are positive and significant.
24. See e.g. Vogt [1994], Bond and Meghir [1994] and Kadapakkam et al. [1998].
25. he results for small and F < 1 firms and for large and F ³ 1 firms lie in between the two "extreme"
subsamples and are available from the authors upon request.
26. This is comparable to what Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988] do.
27. Results available from the authors upon request.
28. The most controversial part of Tobin’s q is the replacement cost of the firm’s fixed assets [see e.g. Lewellen
and Badrinath, 1997]. We experimented with a number of different definitions for Tobin’s q and obtained the
following results [detailed results are available upon request]. (1) When we define Tobin’s q in spirit of Kaplan
and Zingales [1997] [Tobin’s q = [market value of the firm plus total assets minus book value of common equity
minus balance sheet deferred taxes / total assets], all of our results carry over, some are even more pronounced.
(2) When we define Tobin’s q in the spirit of Lindenberg and Ross [1981] (Tobin’s q = (market value of the firm)
/ (total assets plus replacement cost of fixed assets minus book value of fixed assets plus LIFO reserve plus total
debt minus total liabilities), all results carry over qualitatively although there is some reduction in significance.
29. We thank Bruce Petersen for suggesting this test. We estimated R&D capital as R&D spending times 5 or
times 10 assuming that the firm is in a steady state and the R&D stock depreciates at a constant 20 percent or 10
percent rate. These rates are consistent with the range of depreciation rates presented in the literature [Nadiri and
Prucha, 1996]. With Tobin’s q defined as the ratio of the market value to total assets plus this R&D stock,
marginal q remains much more important for the F ³ 1 firms compared to F < 1 firms, and the reverse is true for
average q. The cash flow / q interaction term is negative for the F ³ 1 subsample and positive for the F < 1









Sample (All firms) (Firms with F 1) (Firms with F <1)
Dependent
Variable
It/Kt-1 Rt/Kt-1 It/Kt-1 Rt/Kt-1 It/Kt-1 Rt/Kt-1
Independent
Variables:
Intercept + + + + + +
CFt-1/Kt-1 00 + + + +
c t-1 NA NA + ? ? ?
qt-1 ++ + + + +
q t-1×CFt-1/Kt-1 00 - - + +
F  is the calculated sample period marginal q
CFt-1/Kt-1 is cash flow divided by the book value of capital stock lagged one period
ct-1 is our yearly measure of marginal q lagged one period
qt-1 is Tobin’s q lagged one period
qt-1 CFt-1/Kt-1 is an interaction term of Tobin’s q and cash flow





All F <1 F 1
Variables: Mean Med S.D. Mean Med S.D. Mean Med S.D.
Sales (Mill $) 2750.1 356.9 8648 3266 309.8 9416.0 1965.2 408.5 7258
DSAL 0.04 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.31
Div. Payout Ratio 0.24 0.20 0.64 0.24 0.19 0.80 0.24 0.22 0.27
It/Kt-1 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.30 0.24 0.26
Rt/Kt-1 0.157 0.085 0.229 0.163 0.09 0.24 0.147 0.079 0.212
qt 1.15 0.96 0.69 0.95 0.85 0.44 1.46 1.23 0.87
ct 1.05 0.89 2.72 0.82 0.72 2.57 1.39 1.19 2.90
CFt/Kt 0.35 0.31 0.43 0.35 0.29 0.43 0.36 0.33 0.44
Number of Firms 562 328 234
Number of Obs. 7513 4534 2979
3DQHO%0DWUL[RI&RUUHODWLRQ&RHIILFLHQWV$OOILUPV
F qt It/Kt-1 Rt/Kt-1 CFt/Kt DSAL Sales ct
F 1.0
qt 0.432 1.0
It/Kt-1 0.026 0.177 1.0
Rt/Kt-1 -0.015 0.220 0.339 1.0
CFt/Kt 0.019 0.183 0.330 0.507 1.0
DSAL 0.080 0.142 0.344 0.172 0.136 1.0
Sales -0.064 -0.086 -0.032 -0.078 -0.063 -0.012 1.0
ct 0.116 0.301 0.101 0.036 0.060 0.122 -0.014 1.0
F  is the calculated sample period marginal q
Sales is average total annual sales,
DSAL is average annual growth rate of total sales
Div. payout ratio is the average of total dividends paid over the sample period divided by total cash flows
over the sample period
It/Kt-1 is capital investment divided by the beginning of period book value of capital stock
Rt/Kt-1 is expenditures of research and development divided by the beginning of period book value of capital
stock
qt is Tobin’s q calculated as the market value of equity plus the value of debt divided by total assets
ct is the yearly measure of marginal q
CFt/Kt is cash flow (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends plus (1 - WD[UDWH)




Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6
Sample All F 1 F <1 All F 1 F <1
Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val
CFt-1/Kt-1 0.160 16.29 0.190 10.88 » 0.089 6.82 0.146 14.85 0.093 4.48 0.149 8.66
ct-1 0.005 5.10 0.008 4.67 > 0.002 1.44 0.005 4.86 0.008 4.57 0.002 1.57
qt-1 0.052 11.19 0.039 5.69 < 0.068 7.68 0.060 10.61 0.036 5.27 0.079 8.93
qt-1*CFt-1/Kt-1 -0.018 -3.55 -0.039 -5.34 < 0.040 4.26 -0.045 -8.15 -0.028 -3.79 -0.030 -2.34
1/t*CFt-1/Kt-1 ¾¾ 0.339 8.44 -0.100 -2.54
1/t*ct-1 ¾¾¾¾ ¾ ¾
1/t*qt-1 -0.062 -3.00 ¾¾ ¾ ¾
1/t*qt-1*CFt-1/Kt-1 0.158 12.80 ¾¾ 0.147 7.02
Firms 562 234 328 562 234 328
No. Obs. 7513 2979 4534 7513 2979 4534
R² 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.23
3DQHO%2/6UHJUHVVLRQUHVXOWVZLWK5.DVGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOH
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6
Sample All F 1 F <1 All F 1 F <1
Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val
CFt-1/Kt-1 0.220 25.54 0.134 10.55 < 0.187 14.29 0.204 23.81 0.033 2.27 0.230 13.24
qt-1 0.032 7.93 0.040 8.47 » 0.014 1.66 0.045 9.13 0.037 7.88 0.063 5.59
qt-1 CFt-1/Kt-1 0.004 0.91 0.001 0.25 < 0.083 8.74 -0.025 -5.09 0.013 2.44 0.014 1.06
1/t CFt-1/Kt-1 ¾¾ 0.350 12.14 -0.074 -1.70
1/t qt-1 -0.097 -5.34 ¾¾ -0.197 -5.49
1/t qt-1 CFt-1/Kt-1 0.177 16.41 ¾¾ 0.186 6.81
Firms 562 234 328 562 234 328
No. Obs. 7513 2979 4534 7513 2979 4534
R² 0.35 0.31 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.44
Note: <, >, » means significantly smaller, larger or not significantly different, respectively. The q/cash flow interaction term
is evaluated at the subsample means, when we test for the impacts of cash flow and Tobin’s q. All regressions include 2-digit
industry and year dummies. 1/t× are interaction terms with the reciprocal of time, 1/t. For the other variable definitions see





(see Eq 1,2, and 3)
1979
(Eq 4, 5, and 6 with W )
Long run
(Eq 4, 5, and 6 with W ® ¥)
All F 1 F <1 All F 1 F <1 All F 1 F <1
CFt-1/Kt-1
0.16 - 0.018q 0.19 - 0.039q 0.089 + 0.04q 0.146 + 0.113q 0.433 - 0.028q 0.046 + 0.117q 0.146 - 0.045q 0.093 - 0.028q 0.149 - 0.03q
Evaluated at mean 0.139* 0.134* 0.129* 0.256* 0.402* 0.152* 0.094* 0.053* 0.120*
qt-1
0.052 - 0.018CF 0.039 - 0.039CF 0.068 + 0.04CF -0.002 + 0.113CF 0.036 - 0.028CF 0.079 + 0.117CF 0.06 - 0.045CF 0.036 - 0.028CF 0.079 - 0.03CF
Evaluated at mean 0.046* 0.025* 0.082* 0.074* 0.017* 0.159* 0.045* 0.025* 0.069*
3DQHO%'HSHQGHQWYDULDEOH5.
Whole Period
(see Eq 1,2, and 3)
1979
(Eq 4, 5, and 6 with W )
Long run
(Eq 4, 5, and 6 with W ® ¥)
All F 1 F <1 All F 1 F <1 All F 1 F <1
CFt-1/Kt-1
0.22+0.004q 0.134+0.001q 0.187 + 0.083q 0.204 + 0.152q 0.384 + 0.013q 0.156 + 0.20q 0.204 - 0.025q 0.033 + 0.013q 0.23 + 0.014q
Evaluated at mean 0.22* 0.137*  0.266*  0.353*  0.40* 0.337*  0.175* 0.053* 0.243*
qt-1
0.032+0.004CF 0.04+0.001CF 0.014 + 0.083CF  -0.052 + 0.15CF 0.037 + 0.013CF  -0.134 + 0.20CF 0.045 - 0.025CF 0.037 + 0.013CF 0.063 + 0.014CF
Evaluated at mean 0.032* 0.04*  0.043*  0.05*  0.042* 0.002  0.036*  0.042*  0.067*
Note: q and CF denote qt-1 and CFt-1/Kt-1 ,respectively. All interaction terms are evaluated at the respective sample means for the relevant variables.





Sample All F 1 F <1 All F 1 F <1 All F 1 F <1
Accelerator 0.062 0.082 > 0.047 ¾¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾
t-value 28.52 20.50 18.88 ¾¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾
CFt-1/Kt-1 0.126 0.122 » 0.081 0.161 0.188 < 0.099 0.076 0.074 » -0.009
t-value 13.40 7.26 6.42 14.72 9.65 6.88 11.83 6.93 -1.07
ct-1 0.003 0.004 » 0.001 0.005 0.008 > 0.003 ¾¾ ¾
t-value 3.34 2.73 0.75 5.43 4.59 2.30 ¾¾ ¾
q t-1 0.038 0.024 < 0.057 0.060 0.048 < 0.077 0.024 0.041 » -0.039
t-value 8.39 3.69 6.67 9.40 5.20 7.34 6.62 8.48 -6.29
qt-1 CFt-1/Kt-1 -0.007 -0.015 < 0.037 -0.016 -0.037 < 0.036 0.028 0.003 < 0.125
t-value -1.48 -2.12 4.05 -2.80 -4.48 3.66 8.11 0.61 20.55
Firms 562 234 328 568 234 328 568 234 328
No. Obs. 7513 2979 4534 7513 2979 4534 7513 2979 4534
R² 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.30 0.75 0.62 0.78
Note: <, >, » means significantly smaller, larger or not significantly different, respectively, where the q/cash flow
interaction term is evaluated at the subsample means when we test for the impacts of cash flow and Tobin’s q.





Sample All F 1 F <1
Small Large Small Large
CFt-1/Kt-1 0.16 » 0.21 0.17 » 0.12
t-value 12.38 7.71 7.71 3.62
ct-1 0.0092 > 0.004 0.012 > 0.0018
t-value 5.46 2.93 3.85 1.04
qt-1 0.059 > 0.020 0.043 » 0.030
t-value 8.49 2.15 4.23 2.11
qt-1*CFt-1/Kt-1 -0.022 < 0.015 -0.038 < 0.090
t-value -3.37 0.73 -4.13 3.15
No. Obs. 3756 3757 1363 2144
R² 0.15 0.21 0.11 0.31
Predicted partial derivatives (evaluated at respective means):
CFt-1/Kt-1 0.133 < 0.23 0.12 < 0.21
t-value 15.61 16.27 8.05 13.38
qt-1 0.05 > 0.025 0.027 < 0.055
t-value 8.14 4.52 2.93 5.87
Small: Annual sales < median sales; Large: Annual sales > median sales.
3DQHO%6SOLWVDFFRUGLQJWRGLYLGHQGSD\RXWSROLF\









CFt-1/Kt-1 0.21 > 0.12 0.19 » 0.15
t-value 10.06 7.44 5.27 4.89
ct-1 0.0132 > 0.0054 0.018* > 0.0068
t-value 4.85 5.03 4.00 1.78
qt-1 0.067 > 0.027 0.043 < 0.088
t-value 6.67 4.08 3.29 3.82
qt-1*CFt-1/Kt-1 -0.036 < 0.002 -0.043 < 0.026
t-value -4.22 0.19 -3.83 1.29
No. Firms 149 413 60 89
No. Obs. 1831 5661 733 1098
R² 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.24
Predicted partial derivatives (evaluated at respective means):
CFt-1/Kt-1 0.16 > 0.12 0.11 < 0.17
t-value 11.45 15.48 4.96 10.27
qt-1 0.05 > 0.027 0.023 < 0.10
t-value 5.51 6.05 1.90 5.61
Low dividends: Average firm dividend payout ratio over sample period < 10 percent of cash flows; High dividends:
Average firm dividend payout ratio over sample period > 10 percent of cash flows.
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